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Article text: 
 
In this extended article, Jane Rooney analyses the recent Northern Ireland High 
Court decision that current abortion law is not compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. She suggests that the judgement could have gone 
further in testing the compatibility of the legislation with the ECHR, and that 
possible appeals are unlikely to take the politics of Northern Ireland as closely into 
account. 
 
On 30 November 2015 in the case of The Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission’s Application [2015] NIQB 96, the High Court of Northern Ireland found 
that Northern Irish law regulating abortion was incompatible with Article 8 (right to 
private life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This was an 
historical judgement made possible through the conjoined efforts of many, 
including women directly affected by the legislation, the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission and Amnesty International. 
 
Judge Horner (Mr Justice Mark Horner) delivered a judgement that engaged with 
many complex legal, political and social questions which, although not entirely 
beyond criticism, is to be applauded. He found that the foetus does not have a right 
to life under Article 2 ECHR; that there is no domestic consensus on issues relating 
to abortion in Northern Ireland; and that permitting a woman to travel to England 
to receive an abortion does not mitigate against the harshness of the regulations in 
place. 
 
The Decision of Judge Horner 
 
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) brought an application 
seeking  a declaration that Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 and Section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945 were incompatible 
with Articles 8, 3 (right against inhumane and degrading treatment) and 14 (right 
against discrimination) of the ECHR. Those provisions state that it is a criminal 
offence to carry out, or to assist in carrying out, an abortion in all circumstances 
except when the woman’s life is in danger through mental or physical illness 
resulting from the pregnancy. 
 
The NIHRC argued that there should be further exceptions made in relation to 
serious malformation of the foetus, where there is a fatal foetal abnormality and 
 
Article No 58  
  
European Futures | Article No 58                                                                          Page 2 of 5 
Article No 58  
where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Judge Horner did not find a 
breach of Article 3: there was ‘no question of the State inflicting any ill treatment 
on such vulnerable women’ as the State was ‘not responsible for a woman having a 
fatal foetal abnormality nor for women being impregnated as a result of sexual 
crime’ (Para 119). 
 
Furthermore, there was no breach of Article 14 because it was not strictly necessary 
to address the right against discrimination (Para 168) and it had not been proven 
that the legislation was discriminatory (Para 170). He did, however, find a breach of 
Article 8 right to private life because the relevant legislation did not provide for 
exceptions in relation to fatal foetal abnormalities or pregnancy resulting from rape 
or incest. 
 
Before Judge Horner adjudicated upon Article 8, he engaged in an analysis of some 
of the most pressing questions relating to abortion in Northern Ireland, of which 
three had great prominence: whether the foetus had a right to life, whether there 
existed a domestic consensus on abortion in Northern Ireland and whether requiring 
a woman to travel to receive an abortion was proportionate to the aims of the 
government. 
 
In relation to the first question, Judge Horner considered what margin of 
appreciation (degree of discretion) was afforded to the domestic state in balancing 
different considerations in relation to reproductive rights. He noted that in respect 
to private life (Dudgeon v UK) and a woman’s autonomy (RR v Poland) a narrow 
margin of appreciation was afforded. 
 
Conversely, a wide margin of appreciation would be afforded in cases which affected 
the ‘profound moral views’ of a state on ‘the nature of life’ (AB and C v Ireland) 
(Para 39) and this domestic consensus would trump the European consensus that 
the right to abortion on both sides of the border in Ireland should be extended (Para 
58). He also noted that Strasbourg had avoided making determinations of when the 
right to life began (Vo v France) stating that it was within the margin of the 
appreciation of the domestic state to determine (Para 41). 
 
He therefore engaged in determining whether the foetus had a right to life under 
Article 2 of the ECHR under Northern Irish law. When determining whether there 
was a right to life, he found that Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Ireland provided for the explicit ‘right to life of the unborn’ and that the right to 
life had been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Ireland as 
commencing at the moment of conception (Attorney General (SPUC) v Open Door 
Counselling Ltd) (Para 102). 
 
He then moved to assessing whether the unborn child had a right to life in the 
United Kingdom and found that there was no reasonable doubt that in England and 
Wales the foetus was not a legal person, citing a number of decisions in support 
(including the first precedent Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees 
and Another) (Para 103). 
 
He concluded: ‘[t]here are no grounds for concluding, and no convincing ones have 
been put forward, that the common law in Northern Ireland is any different to that 
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in England and Wales. While the foetus does not have a right to life under Article 2 
in Northern Ireland, pre-natal life here is given protection under certain statutes’ 
(Para 108). 
 
In relation to domestic consensus, Judge Horner stated that AB and C v Ireland 
indicated that what was determinative in that decision was the view of society on 
abortion. However, he found that there was no conclusive evidence of opinion on 
abortion in Northern Ireland and that holding such a referendum would be divisive 
(Para 141). 
 
He did not agree with the finding in AB and C v Ireland that allowing women to 
travel to England to have an abortion would make the relevant provisions 
proportionate to the interference with the woman’s autonomy. He had three 
problems with this argument: it was just as wrong morally to ‘export’ the problem 
of abortion as it was to carry it out in Northern Ireland; if the aim of the legislation 
was to prevent abortion then these measures had not achieved that; and the 
‘protection of morals should not contemplate a restriction that bites on the 
impoverished but not the wealthy. That smacks of one law for the rich and one law 
for the poor’ (Para 142). 
 
Judge Horner then had to decide whether the interference on women’s autonomy 
and private life was permitted under Article 8 – whether the interference was in 
accordance with the law, served a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic 
society. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and Criminal Justice Act (NI) 
1945 did provide laws for interfering with the right to private life and autonomy. 
Judge Horner also recognised that there was a legitimate aim in protecting life, but 
there was not a legitimate aim in protecting the morals of the people as there was 
no evidence of a consensus in relation to abortion in Northern Ireland (Para 147). 
 
He found that it was not legitimate, proportionate or necessary in a democratic 
society to place a prohibition on abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality as well 
as rape and incest (Para 148). In relation to fatal foetal abnormality, there was no 
life to protect when the foetus was not able to live independently of the womb 
(Para 160). In relation to rape and incest, those crimes were the ‘grossest intrusion 
on a woman’s autonomy’. 
 
Although he needed to weigh the interference with a woman’s autonomy against 
the right to life of the foetus, he found the foetus did not have any Article 2 right to 
life in Northern Ireland and only had limited statutory protections inside the womb 
(Para 161). He concluded that current law placed a disproportionate burden on the 
victim of rape and incest, delivering a sensitive appraisal of the distress caused to 
women in those circumstances (Para 162). 
 
Analysis of the Decision 
 
It could be argued that Judge Horner misunderstood the state’s responsibility vis-à-
vis women in relation to Article 3 inhumane and degrading treatment. It is not 
necessary for a state official to have raped a woman or to have caused the death of 
the foetus in order for Article 3 to have been engaged. 
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For example, Article 3 can be engaged when there is a grossly disproportionate 
sentence to a crime (Vinter v UK). It is at least arguable that the threat of potential 
life imprisonment for undergoing an abortion in circumstances of fatal foetal 
abnormality or due to rape or incest is an inhuman punishment for the purposes of 
Article 3. A remedy under this right was underexplored. 
 
Furthermore, in relation to Article 14, Judge Horner could have engaged in some 
analysis of whether the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and Criminal Justice 
Act (NI) 1945 were discriminatory against women. Additionally, although he relied 
on much legal academic literature to support his reasoning, no female legal 
academics were cited, despite the fact that many of the leading scholars in this area 
are women (with the exception of Harris, O’Boyle and Warwick, Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2009), as there are many female authors to 
that textbook). 
 
Despite these reservations to the reasoning, Judge Horner delivered a measured and 
insightful judgement which was clearly cognisant of the unique political and social 
context within which he was making this historical decision. In the months leading 
up to the hearing, legislative proposals had been put forward for narrowing 
permitted grounds for abortion. 
 
The DUP chair of the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Justice Committee, Alistair Ross, 
had attempted to outlaw private clinics, such as the Marie Stopes clinic, which 
provide access to abortion pills within the first 5 to 9 weeks of pregnancy. However, 
this motion had been blocked by a petition of concern. 
 
Draft guidelines on termination of pregnancy circulated hours after Judge Horner’s 
judgement, were found not to be in conformity with the judgement. The draft 
guidelines did include a statement that a fatal foetal abnormality would be taken 
into consideration when determining whether there was a risk to the life of the 
mother. The Northern Ireland Assembly appears to be already resisting the 
judgement. 
 
Judge Horner’s reserve was highlighted by the fact that he did not, in the end, reach 
a conclusion as to whether to issue a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. Instead, he invited the parties to the case to make 
submissions to see if the provisions of the relevant legislation could be read as 
compatible with the ECHR in accordance with Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. 
 
The outcome of those further submissions will be revealed later in December. A 
declaration of incompatibility would place no legal obligation on the government to 
change the offending law as it was primary legislation and not subordinate 
legislation which was under scrutiny. Primary legislation cannot be immediately 
struck down for incompatibility. 
 
If the language of the offending legislation was to be read compatibly with the 
ECHR under Section 3, the outcome of the decision would have immediate legal 
effect, and no legislative changes would be required. Judge Horner was informed by 
the parties to the case that they would likely go forward to appeal (Para 170). 
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If the decision does go to appeal, it is unlikely that the Court of Appeal will be as 
sympathetic as the High Court to the contentiousness of abortion in Northern 
Ireland. On the other hand, a less apologetic judgement from that court, 
condemning the legislation under Articles 3 and 14, may be just the wake-up call 
that the Northern Ireland Assembly needs. 
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